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1. This draft military standard has been prepared by the 
Institute for simulation and Training for PM TRADE and DARPA 
based on currently available technical information but it has not 
been approved for promulgation. It is subject to modification. 
However, pending its promulgation as a coordinated military 
standard, it may be used. 
2. Beneficial comments (recommendations, additions, deletions) 
and any pertinent data which may be of use in improving this 
document should be addressed to: Dr. Bruce McDonald, Institute 
for Simulation and Training, 12424 Research Parkway, suite 300, 
Orlando, FL 32826 by using the self-addressed Standardization 
Document Improvement Proposal Form appearing at the end of this 
document or by letter. 
3. This standard contains requirements for the communication 
architecture to be used to support distributive interactive 
simUlation applications. This document contains the standards 
that specify the communication architecture, the recommended 
practices for implementing the communication architecture, and 
the rational to support these standards and practices. This 
document is not intended to be either a communications or a DIS 
tutorial. This document is not intended to be a guide to good 
system design. Information in these areas will only be presented 
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1.1 Scope. This standard establishes the requirements for 
the communicat ion architecture to be use in a distributed 
interactive simulation application. This document contains both 
the standards and the recommended practices for implementing the 
communication architecture and the rationale behind them. 
1.2 Application. This document has three main purposes . 
The first is to provide government agencies that are procuring 
DIS applications with the information necessary to write 
specifications . As such the document establishes a series o f 
standards for network services, protocols, network performance, 
security, and network management. When invoked in a 
specification or statement of work, these requirements will apply 
to the communication architecture supporting simulation devices 
intended for participation in a Distributed Interactive 
Simulation (DIS). The contractor is responsible for invoking all 
the applicable requirements of this Military Standard on any a nd 
all subcontractors he may employ. The document also contains a 
set of recommended practices to provide guidance in those areas 
where standards have not been set or are not appropriate. 
The second purpose of this document is to provide system 
designers with the information necessary to develop key areas of 
the system. In addition to the standards and recommended 
practices, the document contains extensive rationale supporting 
the choice of key items that have become part of the standard. 
This rational is intended to give the system designer a better 
understanding of why some choices were made and what impact 
deviation from them might have on the system being designed. 
A third purpose is to provide the characteristics of the 
Wide Area Network (WAN) communications service that will be 
required when interconnecting DIS applications at different 
locations . This information, together with the development plans 
and rollout schedules for the various DoD systems that will use 
DIS, will be used by the Defense Information Systems Agency 
(DISA) to plan evolving DoD common-user wide area networks (the 
Defense Information Systems Network or DISN) with the functional, 
performance and security characteristics to support these 
systems . (Rationale: DMSO needs to provide this information to 
DISA for the whole spectrum of modeling and simulation, and this 
document provides an excellent source of the communications 










































2. APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS 
2 .1 Government Documents. 
2.1.1 Specifications, standards, and handbooks. The 
following specifications, standards, and handbooks form a part of 
this document to the extent specified herein. Unless otherwise 
specified, the issues of these documents are those listed in the 
issue of the Department of Defense Index of Specifications and 





12 August 1983 
MIL-STD-1778 
12 August 1983 
MIL-STD-1780 
10 May 1984 
MIL-STD-1781 
10 May 1984 
Military Standard, Internet 
Protocol 
Military Standard, Tra nsmission 
Control Protocol 
Military Standard, File Transfe r 
Protocol 
Military Standard, Simple Mail 
Transfer Protocol 
(Unless otherwise indicated, copies of federal and military 
specifications, standards, and handbooks are available from the 
Standardization Documents Order Desk, Bldg. 4D, 700 Robbins Ave., 
Philadelphia, PA 19111.) 
2.1.2 Other Government documents, drawings, and 
pUblications. The following other Government documents, 
drawings, and publications form a part of this document to the 
extent specified herein. Unless otherwise specified, the issues 
are those cited in the solicitation. 
FIPS PUB 146-1 
April 1991 
U.S. Government Open Systems 
Interconnection Profile 
(GOSIP)Version 2.0 draft. 
(Applications for copies should be addressed to the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, National Technical Information Service 
(NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161.) 
2.2 Non-Government Publications. The following documents 
form part of this document to the extent specified herein. 





















000 adopted are those listed in the issue of the DODISS cited in 
the solicitation. Unless otherwise specified, the issues of 
documents not listed in the DODISS are the issues o f the 
documents cited in the solicitation. 
INSTITUTE OF ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS (IEEE) 
IEEE P1278 1 
IEEE 802-1990 
IEEE Standard for Information 
Technology, Distributed Simulation 
Applications, and Data Entity 
Interchange Formats 
IEEE Standards for Local a nd 
Metropolitan Area Networks -
Overview and Architecture 
(Applications for copies should be addressed to the 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 445 Hoes Lane, 
Piscataway, NJ 08854-4150.) 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION (ISO) 
ISO 7498-1984 
ISO 7498 AD 1-1987 
ISO 7498-2-1989 
ISO 7498-3-1989 
ISO DIS 7498-4 
Information Processing Systems -
(CCITT X.200) Open Systems 
Interconnection - Basic Reference 
Model. 
Information Processing Systems -
Open Systems Interconnection -
Basic Reference Model - Addendum 1: 
Connectionless Mode Transmission. 
Information Processing Systems -
Open Systems Interconnection -
Basic Reference Model - Part 2: 
Security Architecture. 
Information Processing System -
Open Systems Interconnection -
Basic Reference Model - Part 3 : 
Naming and Addressing. 
Information Processing Sys tems -
Open Systems Interconnection -
Basic Reference Model - Part 4 : 
Management Framework, 1989. 
This document was previously the draft military standard 
Protocol Data units for Entity Information and Entity Interaction 
























ISO 8073 -198 6 






ISO 9542 -1988 
ISO DIS 9545 
(CCITT X.207) 
ISO DIS 9595 
ISO DIS 9596 
X.25 LAPB Compatible DTE Data Link 
Procedures 
Information Processing Systems -
Open Systems Interconnection -
Transport Service Definition. 
Information Processing Systems -
Open Systems Interconnection, 
Connection oriented Transport 
Protocol Specification. 
X.25 Packet Level Protocol for Data 
Terminal Equipment 
Network Service Definition 
Information Processing Systems -
Open Systems Interconnection - Data 
Communications Protocol for 
Providing the Connectionless Mode 
Network Service. 
X.25 to Provide OSI Connection-Mode 
Network Service 
Protocol Combinations to Provide 
and Support the OSI Network Service 
Information Processing Systems -
Open Systems Interconnection -
Telecommunications a nd Information 
Exchange Between Syst ems - End 
System to Intermediate System 
Routing Exchange Protocol for Use 
in Conjunction with the Protocol 
for the Provision of the 
Connectionless - Mode 
Network Service. 
Information Processing Systems -
Open Systems Interconnection -
Extended Applica t i on Layer 
Structure (ALS) (198 8 ) . 
Common Management Information 
Service Definition 
Information Processing Systems -
Open Systems Int erconnection -


























Specification - Common Manageme nt 
Information Protocol (CMI P ) (1 988 ). 
End System to Intermed ia t e System 
Routing Exchange Protocol 
Systems Management Overview 
OSI System Management 
Structure of Management Information 
Intermediate System to Intermediate 
System Intra-Domain Routing 
Exchange Protocol 
(Applications for copies of ISO documents should be 
addressed to the American National Standards Institute, 1430 
Broadway, New York, NY 10018.) 
(Non-Government standards and other publications are 
normally available from the organizations that prepare or 
distribute the documents. These documents also may be available 
in or through libraries or other informational services.) 
2.3 Order of precedence. In the event of a conflict 
between the text of this document and the reference cited herein, 
the text of this document takes precedence. Nothing in this 
document, however, supersedes applicable laws and regulations 






















3.1 Acronvms used in this standard. The acronyms used in 





































American National Standards Institute 
Bit Error Rate 
Consultative Committee for International 
Telegraphy and Telephone 
Connectionless Network Protocol 
Common Management Information Protocol 
Common Management Information Services 
Commercial Off The Shelf 
Distributed Interactive Simulation: The present 
name of the standard for interactive simulations. 
End System: an OSI DTE which is the source and/ or 
sink of communicated process information. 
End System to Intermediate System: Usually 
associated with routing. 
Fiber Data Distribution Interface 
File Transfer Access and Management 
Government Open Systems Interconnection Profile 
Hardware 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
Inter Domain Routing Protocol 
Internet Protocol 
Intermediate System: an OSI DTE which interface s , 
routes, maintains MTA information, and dynami ca ll y 
stores naming and addressing files for the ESs . 
Intermediate System to Intermediate System: 
Usually associated with routing. 
Integrated Services Digital Network 
International Organization for Standardization 
Local Area Network 
Local Exercise Manager 
Metropolitan Area Network 
Message Handling System 
National Institute for Standards and Technology 
Open Systems Interconnection 
Personal Computer 
Protocol Data unit 
U.S. Army Project Manager Training Devices 
Simulation Network: An R&D effort which 
demonstrated the ability of simulators to interact 
dynamically over a UN. 
U.S. Army Simulation, Training, and 
Instrumentation Command (formally PMTRADE) 
Software 
Transmission Control Protocol 
Transport Protocol 
University of Central Florida, Institute for 

























User Datagram Protocol 
Wide Area Network 
eXpress Transfer Protocol 
A link and network layer set of protocols 
internationally accepted for DTE DCE interchange. 
3.2 Application interface. The programming access 
mechanism to the communication resources of a network. 
3.3 Application layer (layer 1). The layer of the ISO 
reference model which provides the means for user application 
processes to access and use the network's communicat i ons 
resources. 
3.4 Broadcast mode (BC). A transmission mode ln which a 
single message is sent to all network destinations, i.e. one-to-
all. Broadcast is a special case of multicast. 
3.5 Connectionless (CL). A mode of information transfer 
between peer entities in which each data transfer is independent 
of and not coordinated with previous or subsequent transfers and 
in which no state information is maintained. 
3.6 Connection-oriented (CO). A mode of information 
transfer between peer entities in which a logical association is 
established prior to t he exchange of data and which is maintained 
for the lifetime of the exchange process. 
3.7 Datagram. A unit of data that is transferred as a 
single, no-sequenced, unacknowledged unit. 
3.8 Data link layer (layer 2). The layer of the ISO 
reference model which provides the functional and procedural 
means to transfer data between stations, and to detect and 
correct errors that may occur in the physical layer. 
3.9 Distributed Interactive Simulation (DIS). An exercise 
involving the interconnection of a number of simulation and/ or 
real devices in which the simulated entities are able to interact 
within a computer generated environment. The simUlation or real 
devices may be present in one location or be distributed 
geographically. 
3.10 Emitter. A device that is able to discharge 
detectable electromagnetic or acoustic energy. 
3.11 Entity. An element of a simulated world (such as a 
vehicle) that is generated and controlled by one or more host 
computers. An entity may also be an element of the simulated 
world, such as cultural features including building and bridges, 






















3.12 Exercise. See Simulation Exercise. 
3.13 Host or Host computer. 
network. 
A computer attached to a 
3.14 Interoperability. The capability, promoted but not 
guaranteed by joint conformance with a given set of standards, 
that enables heterogeneous equipment, generally built by var ious 
vendors, to work together in a network environment. 
3.15 Local Area Network (LAN). A communications network 
designed for a moderate size geographic area and characterized by 
moderate to high data transmission rates, low delay, and low bit 
error rates. 
3.16 Long-Haul network. See Wide Area Network. 
3.17 Multicast mode (Me) A transmission mode in which a 
single message is sent to multiple network destinations, i.e. 
one-to-many . 
3.18 Network layer (layer 3). The layer of the ISO 
reference model which performs those routing and relaying 
services necessary to support data transmission over 
i nterconnected LAN segments. 
3.19 Network manaqement. The collection of administrative 
structures, policies and procedures which collectively provide 
for the management of the organization and operation of the 
network as a whole. 
3.20 Node. A general term denoting either a switching 
element in a network or a host computer attached to a network. 
3.21 Non-Real time service. Any protocol function which 
does not require real time service. (see Real Time Service .) 
3.22 ISO Reference Model (ISORM). A model that organi zes 
the data communication concept into seven layers and defines the 
services that each layer provides. 
3.23 Physical layer (layer 1). The layer of the ISO 
reference model which provides the mechanical, electrical, 
functional, and procedural characteristics access to the 
transmission medium. 
3.24 Presentation layer (layer 6). The layer of the ISO 
reference model which frees the application processes from 





















3.25 Protocol. A set of rules and formats (semantic a nd 
syntactic) which determines the communication behavior of (N)-
entities in the performance of (N)-functions. 
3.26 Protocol Data unit (POU). A unit of data specified in 
an (N)-protocol and consisting of (N)-protocol-information and 
(N)-user-data. The term is used in this standard to refer to 
data that is passed on a network between application processes. 
3.27 Protocol suite. A defined set of protocols within the 
communication architecture profile which constitutes a permitted 
implementation. 
3.28 Real time service. A service which satisfies timing 
constraints imposed by the service user. The timing constraints 
are user specific and should be such that the user will not be 
adversely affected by delays within the constraints. 2 (DIS 
requires 5% of all data be processed within lOOms and 95% be 
completed within 300ms3 , therefore the DIS real time threshold 
is 100ms.)4 
3.29 Reliable service. A communication service in which 
the number and type of errors that the user finds in the data is 
acceptable for the application. Reliable communication may 
require specific mechanisms in order to achieve the user's 
requirements : error detection and notification, such as bit 
errors based on a too high BER as defined by the user or error 
detection and correction from POU errors, such as bit errors, 
duplicated POUs, missing POUs, or out-of-sequence POUs. 
3.30 Session layer (laver 5). The layer of the ISO 
reference model which provides the mechanisms for organizing and 
structuring the interaction between two entities. 
3.31 Transport layer (layer 4). The layer of the ISO 
reference model which accomplishes the transparent transfer of 
data over the established link, providing an end-to-end service 
with high data integrity. 
3 .3 2 Wide Area Network (WAN). 
designed for large geographic areas. 
Network . 
A communications network 
Sometimes call Long-Haul 
2 Some data communications, e.g . voice, may require compensation to meet 
the timing constraint. 
3 These numbers are based on limited experience and are provided only as 
an experimental baseline. 
4 The amount of delay acceptable in a given application depends on the 
nature and intended use of the application. For some applications the 





















3.33 Unicast mode (UC). A transmission mode in which a 
single message is se t to a single network destination, i.e. one-
to-one. 
3.34 Unreliable service. A communication service ln which 
transmitted data is not acknowledged. Such data typically 
arrives in order, complete, and without errors. However, if an 










































4. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS 
4.1 Communication Architecture Overview 
4.1.1 Introduction. The purpose of the communication 
subsystem for DIS is to provide an appropriate interconnected 
environment for effective integration of locally and globally 
distributed simulation entities. There are many diverse aspects 
of this integration, ranging from the nature of the entities 
represented within the common simulated environment, to the 
common communication interface used for receiving packets of 
information from other simulators. This standard is concerned 
only with the necessary communication system standards which must 
be accepted and adopted for supporting the integrated framework. 
The Protocol Data units (PDUs) defined in the DIS Standard 
are the "lingua franca" by which any two simulators or simulation 
sites can communicate. This includes simulators of different and 
unrelated design and architecture. No restriction is placed on 
what the participating simulator or site is, only on the way it 
communicates with the outside world. 
Where the DIS PDUs define the information passed between 
simulators and simulation sites, this standard will define how 
those simulators, sim lation sites, and other DIS enti ties can be 
connected in a modular fashion to facilitate the communication at 
the local and global levels. This will be done through the 
required use of commu ications standards which promote 
interoperability, such as the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) 
reference model and the Government OSI Profile (GOSIP). 
4.1.2 Approach t o Communication Architecture. This 
s tandard specifies an evolutionary approach to be taken f or 
implementation of a communication architecture for DIS. This 
approach, defined in terms of phases, is needed due to the fact 
that certain requirements for DIS cannot be met wi th the current 
OSI/GOSIP standardized communication network protocols. As 
protocols are developed which meet these requirements and are 
adopted by standards committees, they will be incorporated into 
this standard. 
The communications architecture for DIS employs a layered 
model which is based on the seven layer OSI Reference Model 
(OSIRM) (see ISO 7498 ) . The standards define the communication 
functions of the network by dividing them into a hierarchical set 
of layers. Each layer performs an integral subset of special 
functions required to communicate with another layer of similar 
type. There are seven layers in the OSIRM: Application, 
Presentation, Session, Transport, Network, Data Link, and 





















The functions p r ovided by each layer, as p r esented by 








Concerns the transmission of an unstructured bit 
stream over the physical medium; deals with the 
mechanical, electrical, functional, and procedural 
characteristics to access the physica l medium. 
Provi es for the reliable trans f er o f i n f orma t ion 
acros s the physical link; sends bl o c ks o f data 
(frame s) with the necessary synch r on i z a tion, e r r o r 
contro l, and flow control. 
Provides upper layers with independence from the 
data transmission and switching technologies used 
to connect systems; responsible for establishing, 
maintaining, and terminating connections. 
Provides reliable, transparent tra nsfer of d a t a 
endpoints; provides end-to-end error recovery a nd 
flow control. 
Provides the control structure for c ommunica t ion 
between applications; establishes, ma nages, a nd 
terminates connections (sessions) between 
cooperating applications. 
6-Presentation Provides independence to the application processes 
from differences in data representation (syntax). 
7-Application Provides access to the OSI environment for users 
and also provides distributed informa t i on 
services. 
4.1.2.1 Approach to OSI Compliance. The stra tegy f or OS I 
compliance is based on a phased, evolutionary approa ch. The 
first step to this evolution is the recommendation o f an inte r i m 
architecture, based on available network products and services, 
which is capable of s pporting current exercises and 
communications experiments. The interim architecture will then 
transition to OSI/GOSIP standards over a period of years, as 
multicast communications protocol standards are adopted to 
s upport DIS. 
4.1.2.2 Rationale: Benefits of DIS Compli a nce to the 
OSI/GOSIP Architecture. DIS compliance with the OSI / GOSIP 
architecture provides the following benefits: reduced cost, 





















increased interoperability, and increased application-level 
functionality. Efforts to ensure conformance to OSI/GOSIP 
standards and ensure interoperability between products of 
different vendors means that computer networking can be done as 
an integration of multi-vendor, commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) 
components. Easy access to vendor interoperable COTS OSI/GOSIP 
products gives wider availability to networking capabilities at a 
reduced cost. 
Not only will OSI/GOSIP standards provide interoperability 
between products, but international interoperability will also be 
increased. The OSI standards are international in scope and will 
be used by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, 
among others. Using OSI standards opens the possibility that 
interoperation with our NATO allies will be accomplished within 
the framework of international standards. 
4.1.3 Key Assumptions For This Standard. This document 
makes a number of assumptions about underlying requirements of 
the DIS application and how they will be applied. These issues 
and assumptions must be understood if the application of this 
document is to be successful. 
4.1.3.1 Long Ha 1 Connection. Simulators at different 
sites will have to be connected via a wide Area Network (WAN). 
This document defines the functional and performance 
characteristics which must be satisfied by the communications 
service, including the WAN. It is the goal of this 
communications architecture that the WAN be based on standards 
such as frame relay, switched Multimegabit Data Service (SMDS), 
Broadband ISDN, and SONET. The provision of the WAN will depend 
on the evolution of these high speed communications services in 
the marketplace and the particular organization using the DIS 
applications. 
Wide area networks today do not in general support 
multicasting. If two or three sites using DIS are to participate 
in a demonstration or exercise, they could be interconnected by 
point-to-point circuit:s or a network with sufficient capacity to 
support repeated transmission to each site. This, however, wo uld 
become uneconomic for a larger number of sites. 
For DoD systems that will be using DIS, the Defense Modeling 
and Simulation Office (DMSO), in collaboration with the Defense 
Advanced Research Pro j ects Agency (DARPA) and the Defense 
Information Systems Agency (DISA), is establishing a testbed 
Defense Simulation Int:ernet (DSI) to provide an interim WAN that 
supports multicasting and satisfies the latency requirements of 
DIS (see section 4.2. 2 .2). The testbed DSI is an extension of 
DARPA's Terrestrial Wideband Network (TWBNet) and will be 
available as a pilot operational system to support DIS and other 





















system. This target system will be part of the Defense 
Information System Network (DISN) and will employ commercial 
standards-based services such as those listed in the following 
section. 
The nature and development of WANs for DIS application is taking 
two distinct paths. The first is the establishment of a 
permanent infrastructure that will connect all DIS simulator 
sites. Although physically one large network, it will support 
multiple exercises via the creation of an individual logical 
network for each exercise. This approach is called the Defense 
Simulation Internet. The second approach is the establishment of 
Ad Hoc WANs as necessary to support exercises and tests. The 
primary mechanism for this is the bandwidth-on-demands services 
starting to be offered by the major communications suppliers 
(e.g. AT&T, MCI, Sprint). The concept is that a netwo rk 
connecting any set of simulator sites can be created quickly and 
efficiently from commercial services without the cost of 
maintaining a permanent infrastructure. The Advanced Distributed 
Simulator Technology (ADST) program is exploring this approach. 
This document does not assume either of these approaches and will 
support both of them. 
4.1.3.2 Video Conferencing & other Tools. A number o f DIS 
documents, including the concept of operations, have identi fied a 
video conferencing requirement. This is to support exercise 
planning, briefing, and debriefing, but specific requirements 
(e.g. number of sites, functionality) have not been identified. 
The communications industry is creating new ways to achieve such 
video conferencing, but mature products are not yet available. 
Video conferencing is very demanding of network capabilities and 
will have a major impact on any DIS network design. Because the 
requirements for video conferencing are not clearly identified 
and because industry offerings are not stable, video conferencing 
is not addressed in t is document. This requirement will however 
be addressed in future versions as the requirements and available 
services become better understood. 
4.1.3.3 Multiple Exercises. DIS has the ability to 
accommodate multiple I~xercises over the network by assigning each 
exercise a different exercise 10. Those entities participating in 
the exercise will con ain the assigned exercise 10 in their PDUs. 
When the exercises involved require any level of security, then 
security mechanisms must be in place for the level of security 
needed. This standard will not address or support multiple 
exercises that have different levels of security. 
4.2 Service Requirements. This section describes the 
services required to be provided by the communication 
architecture for DIS applications. These services are divided 
into two categories: communication service requirements and 





















communication subsystem of the DIS standard are based on 
experience with state-of-the-art distributed simulation 
activities as well as projections based on anticipated use and 
evolution of the technology base. 
4 .2.1 Communication Service Requirements. Distributed 
simulation environment support requires various types of 
communication. The communication requirements encompass control 
and data. Data commun ications, including voice, may be with or 
without real time requ irements and will likely be augmented to 
include such things as video and other forms of pictorial 
information. Upon the introduction of each of these forms of 
traffic, they shall share communications facilities instead of 
having disjoint facilities for each. 
A summary of the communication service requirements is shown 
in Table I. 
















Low Latency Packet Delivery 
Security 
Flexible Entity Naming & Addressing 
High Throughput 
4 .2.1.1 Service Requirements of 
requires certain services to make its 
These services are grouped into broad 
DIS. 
PDUs. Each DIS PDU 
communication practical. 
classes of operation for 
4.2.1.1.1 Communication Classes Based on Requirements. 
This section establis es DIS communication classes based on th e 
application service c aracteristics for both the required and 
recommended interim DIS PDUs. Each DIS PDU requires certain 





















These characteristics are grouped into broad classes of operation 
for DIS. 
4.2.1.1.1.1 ~)lication Requirements. The DIS application 
(POUs) has been characterized using the following subset of 
communication serViCE! requirements: unicast, multicast, 
broadcast, reliable, unreliable, real time, non-real time, packet 
size, and bulk transfer. The application service characteristics 
are used to define a service model necessary to support DIS 
communication. The service model developed from the POU 
characterization shall be used to develop the interface to the 
application and lower layers. 
4.2.1.1.1.2 DIS POU Service Characterization. DIS 
functional requirements are to provide: Entity Information, 
Entity Interaction, DIS Management, and Environment Information. 
within each functional category, POUs have been defined or 
recommended to satisfy specific requirements. The October 1991 
version of the DIS standard defines ten required POUs and six 
recommended interim POUs. 6 The application services for 
required and recommended DIS POUs are defined in Tables II and 
III, respectively. 
Although packet size and bulk transfer are included as 
application requirements in 4.2.1.1.1.1, it is not presented in 
the summary tables for the following reason. Inter-entity 
communication in a distributed interactive simulation environment 
consists largely of packets sent between two or more of the 
simulation participants. These packets are usually small, <250 
bytes, and constitute the majority of POU traffic. All POUs 
listed in Table II and III fall into the IIsmall packet II 
characterization. There are situations which mandate non-real 
time, point-to-point, reliable bulk transfer, however. Such 
situations arise when moving large items such as database files 
or video images. The bulk transfers fall into the Network and/or 
Simulation Management functions, but there are currently no POUs 
which reflect this typ e of interaction. Consequently, bulk 
transfer is considered a special case. 
6 The October version of the DIS standard specifies three recommended 
PDUs for Update Threshold Control. As of this writing, tho se PDUs have been 





I TABLE II. Required DIS PDU Communication Services 
I I Reliab:e I Best I BC I MC I UC I Real I Effort Time 
I Entity J:f J;f J:f state 
Fire desired J:f J:f J:f 
I Detonation desired J:f J;f J:f 
Service J:f J;f (few 
I Request seconds ) 
Resupply J:f J;f (few 
I 
Offer seconds) 
Resupply J:f J;f (few 
Received seconds) 
I Resupply J:f J;f ( few Cancel seconds) 
I 
Repair J:f J;f (few 
Complete seconds) 
Repair J:f J;f (few 
I Response seconds ) Collision J:f J;f ;;I 
I TABLE III. Recommended DIS PDU Communication Services 
I I Reliable I Best I BC I MC I UC I Real I Effort Time 
I 
Emitter desired J:f J:f J;f 
Radar desired J:f J;f J;f 
I 
Activate J:f J;f 
Request 
Activate J:f J:f 
I Response Deactivate J:f J;f 
Request 

























DIS Management will require additional capability beyond the 
Activate and Deactivate PDUs. Although these capabilities have 
not yet specified, Table IV projects additional application 
requirements for these areas. 
TABLE IV. DIS Functional Requirements Communication Services 
JEte I Best I BC I MC I uc I Real I Effort Time 
Network J;f J;f 
Management 
Simulation J;f desired J;f 
Management 
4.2.1.1.1.2.1 Entity Information. The Entity State PDU 
(ESPDU) constitutes the bulk of network traffic for a simulation 
exercise. Currently, the appearance updates represented by the 
ESPDU are of most interest to exerClse participants within a 
limited radius of the initiating entity. Any exercise 
participant which is not in the area of interest, but receives 
the ESPDU, will have to filter out this unwanted information. 
Therefore, Entity State has a strong requirement for multiple 
multicast interactions. Multicast interactions deliver identical 
packets to multiple recipients as part of a single sender 
operation. A multicast data transfer provides co-located entity 
groups the capability of communicating state information based on 
locale in the simulated exerClse. 
In addition to their multicast requirements, ESPDUs must be 
delivered in real time but do not need to be transmitted 
reliably. Dead Reckoning (DR) algorithms are used to predict the 
entity's position over time in order to preserve network 
bandwidth by reducing the frequency at which state information is 
required. Reliability need only be a best effort. If an ESPDU 
is lost, the DR models used to reduce network traffic may also be 
able to account for the lost packet. 
4.2.1.1.1.2.2 Entity Interaction. Entity Interaction PDUs 
have varied characteristics. within the Weapons Fire category, 
the Fire PDU (FPDU) and the Detonation PDU (DPDU) have the same 
service characterization. Similar to the ESPDU, both the FPDU 
and the DPDU have a strong multicast requirement. This 
requirement allows only those entities within the area of 






















These POUs also have a real time requirement, and should be 
more reliable than ESPOUs. Whereas ESPOUs can rely on DR to 
extrapolate position after packet loss, FPOUs and OPOUs are not 
as robust. When a weapon impacts, it is crucial that everyon e in 
the multicast group receive that information so "killed" targe t s 
do not continue to play in the exercise. A high degree of 
reliability is desired for the FPOUs and OPOUs, however current 
multicast protocols do not provide this service. Therefore, 
FPOUs and OPOUs must use a best effort real time multicast 
service. 
The Logistics Support POUs (i.e., Service Request, Resupply 
Offer, Resupply Received, Resupply Cancel, Repair Complete, a nd 
Repair Response) represent activities which, although long in 
duration, do not require real time service. The resupply and 
repair interactions require a simple reliable transaction 
(request/reply) paradigm. This reliability is built into th e 
application by pairing the acknowledgement (or reply) POU with 
the request (e.g., Service Request and Resupply Offer POUs). Th e 
Logistics Support POUs do not require multicast, because only the 
entities involved in the service are interested. Therefore, the 
Logistics Support POUs are characterized as requiring an 
unreliable unicast service. 
The last required category of POUs in Entity Interaction is 
Collisions. Collisio POUs require a real time, unicast service. 
Again, only the entities involved in the collision will be 
interested in this information. Changes in entity appearance 
resulting from the collision will be communicated using ESPOUs. 
The only category of POUs not required for Entity 
Interaction is Electronic Interaction. Electronic Interaction 
currently consists of two recommended POUs, Emitter and Radar. 
Both POUs desire a reliable real time multicast transmission but, 
as stated before, this is not available. Therefore, these POUs 
are characterized as requiring best effort real time multicast. 
4.2.1.1.1 .2. 3 DIS Manaqement. There are no POUs specified 
for Network Managemen1:. Network management will be handled by a 
standard network management protocol (e.g., Simple Network 
Management Protocol or Common Management Information Protocol) 
and will not require DIS POUs to accomplish the management of the 
physical network. Ne1:work management is accomplished with an 
unreliable unicast service. 
The Simulation Management category of POUs is responsible 
for the activation and deactivation of simulation players. The 
request to activate or deactivate entities in a simulation 
exercise (i.e., Activate and Deactivate Request and Response 
POUs) requires a simple reliable transaction (request/reply) 
paradigm. The reliability is built into the application by 





















(e.g., Activate Request and Activate Response POUs). This 
service is characterized as non-real time unicast. other 
possible functions of simulation Management include management 
and control messages spanning multiple exercises. This type of 
service desires a reliable multicast transmission, however 
reliable multicast is not currently available. Therefore, this 
type of service is characterized as reliable unicast. In 
addition to the packet form of interaction, there are situations 
which mandate non-real time, point-to-point, reliable bulk 
transfer. Such situations arise when moving large items such as 
databases or video images. Standard file transfer protocols such 
as File Transfer Protocol (FTP) or File Transfer Access and 
Management (FTAM) will be used. 
There are no POUs required or recommended for Performance 
Measures. If POUs are developed for this functional area, the 
required services will fall into one of the established service 
classes. 
4.2.1.1.1.2.4 Environment Information. There are no POUs 
required or recommended for Environment Information. If POUs are 
developed for this functional area, the required services will 
fall into one of the established service classes. 
4.2.1.2 Communic ation Classes. From the previously stated 






A mode of operation where the multicast service 
provider uses no added mechanisms for reliability 
except those inherent in the underlying service. 
Unreliable Unicast 
A mode of operation where the unicast service 
provider uses no added mechanisms for reliability 
except those inherent in the underlying service. 
Reliable Unicast 
A mode of operation where the unicast serVlce 
provider uses whatever mechanisms are available to 
ensure the data is delivered in sequence wi th no 
duplicates and no errors. 





















TABLE V. DIS Application Service Model 
CLASS 1 ~ CLASS 2 CLASS 3 
Unreliable Unreliable Reliable 
Multicast Unicast Unicast 
Entity Service Collision 
State Request 




















4.2.2 Performance Requirements 
4.2.2.1 Network Bandwidth Requirements. Network bandwidth 
requirements are subject to "best guess" estimation procedures 
due to the combination of man-in-the-loop and non-deterministic 
simulated adversaries in DIS7. The traffic requirements result 
from the frequency at which the PDUs are generated; the size of 
7 The terms bandwidth and traffic shall be used 
interchangeably, with both referring to the total number of bits 





















the individual POUs remains relatively stable. See Appendix B 
for a detailed explanation of bandwidth estimation procedures. 
4.2.2.2 Latency Requirements. The following standards 





Total latency permitted between the output of 
a POU at the application level of a simulator 
and input of that POU at the application 
level of any other simulator in that exercise 
when that exercise contains simulated units 
whose interactions may be tightly coupled. 
Total latency permitted between the output of 
a POU at the application level of a simulator 
and input of that POU at the application 
level of any other simulator in that exercise 
when that exercise contains only simulated 
units whose interactions are not tightly 
coupled. 
Maximum dispersion of arrival times of the 
voice POU at the application level of the 
device converting digital voice to analog. 
4.2.2.2.1 Rationale. Some interactions between simulated 
entities are very tightly coupled in time. That is, the action 
of an individual controlling one of the entities may be a 
reaction to the activity of another. How tightl y these 
interactions are coupled in time depends on the performance of 
the unit being controlled. High performance units, that is those 
units that react quickly to a human controllers input, tend to be 
very tightly coupled. An example of this is one simulated 
fighter aircraft flying in close formation with another. units 
that respond to control inputs less quickly, such as ships, are 
only loosely coupled. 
The issue of communications latency is directly related to 
how tightly a simulated entity is coupled to the entity to which 
it is reacting. The more tightly coupled two simulated entities 
are, the less latency is permitted in the communications that 
carry the state data of each to the other. Allowable latency 
under different circumstances is the subject of considerable 
debate. Little research of the quality that can serve as the 
basis of standards for latency has been done. The best 
information available is from the flight simulator industry, 
which for many years as been struggling with a related issue 
























Humans cannot distinguish differences in time that are less 
than 100 milliseconds. This is due to physiological factors 
of the human body. This effectively provides a floor 
latency/transport delay value. That is, with a human in the 
control loop, t ere is no benefit to be gained from 
latency/transport delay less than 100 milli seconds. 
In situations where latency/transport delay reaches 300 
milliseconds, pilots start compensating for the lag in 
response. The result is a phenomenon known as pilot Induced 
Oscillation (PIO). Such PIO can range from a minor 
annoyance to total loss of control. 
The flight simulation community has also experimented with 
schemes to compensate for transport delay by predicting the 
behavior of the device being controlled. This approach showed 
promise , but the main emphasis in dealing with transport delay 
has been in reducing the delay by faster processing a nd better 
communications within the simulator. The DIS community has also 
begun to explore prediction of position as a means to compensate 
for latency in tightly coupled interaction. Northrop has done 
the most work in this area. Studies reported to the DIS 
communityB suggest that sophisticated prediction algorithms can 
compensate for up to 750 milliseconds of latency in the 
interaction of high performance aircraft carrying out radical 
maneuvers. 
The position of simulated vehicles is not the only 
consideration in dealing with latency. DIS networks will also 
carry voice in the simulation of tactical radio nets. A 
speaker's voice will be converted from analog from to a digital 
data stream that will be treated as just another series of PDUs. 
At the listener's position these will be converted back into 
analog form and will be output to speakers and/or headphones. 
Latency in such voice communications carries its own 
considerations. 
In the case of an overseas phone call that was routed Vla a 
geosynchronous satellite, latency of a half second or more is 
inherent in such communication. In normal conversation this is 
annoying but the speakers can generally adjust to it without 
difficulty. However, in the heat of a simulated operation such 
delays would render a simulated radio net unusable a nd would not 
be acceptable. Also, there is no prediction mechanism that can 
compensate for delays in voice traffic. 
B position paper "Techniques for Extrapolation, Delay 
Compensation, and Smoothing with Preliminary Results and an 
Evaluation Tool," S. Goel, K. Morris, IST-CR-9l-l3, Summary 
Report: The Fifth Work shop on Standards for the Interoperability 





















The dispersion of the arrival times of vo i ce PDUs is also 
i mportant. In the process of converting analog voice to a 
digital data stream, the analog signal is sampled a t regular 
intervals and each sample is converted to a dig i tal message. Fo 
the reconstruction of the voice back to analog these messages 
should ideally arrive at the same regular interval. Howeve r , du 
to a variety of fact o rs, there will some dispersion of arrival 
times. If the dispersion is too great, voice quality will s u ffe 
and may be unintelligible. The mechanism of converting voice 
from digital to anal og form can handle some dispersion in arriva 
times. It is also p ossible to deliberately hold inc oming vo ice 
POUs in an accumulating FIFO buffer and then meter them to the 
voice reconstruction mechanism at a same rate at which the voice 
was sampled. This technique would eliminate the effects of dela 
dispersion, but would do so at the cost of additional overall 
latency. 
4.2.2.2.2 Allocation of Latency Values. In designi ng 
s ystems that meet the total latency standards defined above , it 
is important to allocate these latencies in a reasonable manner. 
For example, if one designs a simulator with a latency of 45 
milliseconds between the application layer and the media (l ayer 
1) of the LAN to which it is attached, it will still me e t the 
standard of 100 mill · seconds for total latency with similar 
simulators on the sa1e LAN. However, if it becomes part of a n 
exercise that includes simul ators from other geographic sites, 
the total latency will likel y exceed 100 milliseconds due to the 
latency consumed by the WAN connecting the sites. 
For this reason, the following standard allocati on of 
latency shall be: 
10 milliseconds 
80 milliseconds 
28 0 milliseconds 
Maximum latency between the a pplication a nd 
physical layers of any DIS simulator. 
Max imum latency occupied by the media, 
bridges, routers, gateways, 
encryption/decryption devices , long-haul 
edia, and other components of a network that 
connects simulators whose interactions may be 
tightly coupled. 
Maximum latency occupied by the local medi a , 
long-haul media, bridges, routers, gateways, 
encryption/decryption devices , a nd o ther 
components of a network that connects 
simulators whose interactions are not tightly 
coupled. 





















Application -- 100 Milliseconds (tightly coupled) .. 300 Milliseconds (loosely coupled) P 
Presentation 
Session Note: 
Tranzport These intersystem times include time consumed by all media, 
bridges, routers, gateways, 
Network encryption/decryption devices, and Intervening networks 
Link 
Physical .. 80 Milliseconds (tightly coupled) .. - P 280 Milliseconds loose I y cou led p 

















4.2.2.3 Error Detection/Correction. Section 4 .2.1 o f thi s 
document, which defines the required services of the 
communications architecture, identifies POUs which must be 
delivered reliably. This is a specific term that means that each 
of those POUs must be delivered to its destination in the order 
in which it was sent and without error. Implied in this 
definition is that the receipt of each POU must be a cknowledged 
and retransmitted if necessary. Such acknowledgement and 
retransmission will be handled by the error detection/ correc t i on 
mechanism of the of the protocols used. That is, there is no 
action required at the application level other than to i ndica t e 
that a particular POU is to be sent reliably. The receiving 
application can assume that all POUs sent reliab l y are in order 
and intact. 
POUs not requiri ng reliable delivery will be given best 
effort delivery. Thes e POUs make up the bulk of network tra f fic 
and include those POUs that are multicast to all simulators in a 
DIS exercise. Acknowledgement and retransmission, as s o c i a t ed 
with reliable delivery, is not feasible due to the a dditiona l 
latency and network bandwidth that would be require d. Instead 
the application, via its dead reckoning mechanism, i s tole rant of 
occasionally missed packets. There is also the possibility tha t 
a POU with corrupted data may be received. The processing o f 
such corrupted data may create unacceptable behavior in the 
receiving simulator. To prevent this the DIS communications 
architecture will include in its best effort delivery a checks um 
mechanism in its tran~;port level protocol. This checksum wi l l 





















received POU, the POU will be discarded by the c ommuni cations 
software. That is, i t will not be made visible to the 
application. 
4.3. The Communication Architecture Protocol suite s f or 
DIS. The DIS commun i cation architecture will be d ivided i nto 
three phases. The following diagram shows the thre e phases of 
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Phase 0 is a proof-of-concept for DIS communication 
applications. The Phase 0 communication architecture is composed 














- Distributed Interactive Simulation PDUs 
- Simple Network Management Protocol (RFC 1157) 
- Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (RFC 821) 
- (Terminal Protocol) (RFC 854) 
- File Transfer Protocol (RFC 959 ) 
- Netwo rk Time Protocol (RFC 1119) 
- User Datagram Protocol (RFC 768) 
- Transmission control Protocol (RFC 793) 
- Internet Protocol (RFC 791) 
- Inte r net Control Message Protocol (RFC 792) 
- Address Resolution Protocol (RFC 826 ) 
- A Reverse Address resolution Protocol (RFC 903 ) 
- STream-II (RFC 1190) or XTP (by PEl) 
Phase 1 is proof-of-concept of the DIS OSI communication 
infrastructure and hybrid implementation of the multicas t 
protocol. The Phase 1 communication architecture is composed of 












- Distributed Interactive Simulation PDUs 
- Common Management Information Protocol (ISO 
- Message Handling System (CCITT X.400) 
- virtual Terminal Protocol (ISO 9041 ) 
- File Transfer Access and Management (ISO 8571) 
- modified Network Time Protocol (RFC 1119) 
- ConnectionLess Transport Protocol (ISO 8602) 
- Transport Protocol Cl ass 4 (ISO 8073) 
- ConnectionLess Network Protocol (ISO 8473) 
- STream-II Protocol (RFC 1190) or XTP (by PEl) 
Phase 2 is an enhanced OSI architecture based upon lessons 
learned in Phase 1, added functionality, and final versions of 
OSI/GOSIP multicast protocols. The Phase 2 communication 









- Distributed Interactive Simulation PDUs 
- Common Management Information Protocol (ISO 
9596) with possible extensions for multicast group 
management 
- Message Handling System (CCITT X.400) 
- virtual Terminal Protocol (ISO 904 1) 
- File Transfer Access and Management (ISO 8571) 
- OSI Time Protocol (unde fined) 
- ConnectionLess Transport Protocol (I SO 8602) 
























- Transport Protocol Class 5 to provide a reliable 
multicast service (undefined) 
- ConnectionLess Network Protocol (ISO 8473) 
- Multipeer/Multicast Protocol to provide 
bandwidth reservation (undefined) 
Note: All three phases of the communication architecture shall 
require a group manager function to specify the group membership 
management, group initiation, and group communication 
termination. 
4 .4 Interoperability Requirements. Interoperability can 
virtually always be achieved when the same engineer (or group of 
engineers) undertakes the communications problem at all sites . 
Interoperability that the DIS initiative is attempting requires 
that interactive operations be achieved by separate engineers at 
each site, consulting a standard document, and without 
communicating with each other. Such interoperability requires 
that the interface of each simulator to the network be specified 
down to the hardware plug. Simulators that comply , can be 
plugged in and will interoperate. 
strict interoperability requires that the standard take care 
of all technical aspec ts of linking together parts of the 
network. Only administrative details are left to be negot iated by 
the participants and the network. A good illustration of strict 
interoperability is t e current telephone service. Telephone 
sets , modems, and fax machines may be produced by anyone. So 
long as they comply with certain specifications and FCC rules, 
they can be plugged i and will interoperate. The user must 
negotiate with the network for access to a socket and network 
address (telephone number). There may exist private telephone 
nets that are not ope to all. So long as the open standard is 
complied with, access to the private net is denied by choice , not 
by problems of compatibility. 
Much progress has been made over the past decade on 
standardizing approaches to interconnecting computer systems. 
Three aspects of the ~3imulation application distinguish DIS from 
the more general computer/communication interconnection. These 
are: 1) real time delivery requirements for interactive, 
man-in-the loop behavior 2) multicast delivery options for 
convenient updating o f shared data items and 3) military security 
considerations. The approach to interoperability specified in 
this standard is to adopt the more general communication 
framework, augmenting it only as necessary to meet the specific 
additional requiremen1:s of distributed interactive simulation. 
Any approach taken toward communication interoperability 
must apply as well to as wide a variety of existing simulators as 





















be possible with minimal disruption of existing simulators, even 
at the expense of optimality and efficiency. To accomplish this 
for the widest class of existing simulators, including those 
already interconnected as well as those running stand alone, only 
the minimum properties should be standardized to accomplish the 
integration. This allows as many pre-existing configurations as 
possible to remain compliant with the minimum change, as well as 
accommodating the maximum flexibility for future innovation with 
minimum disruption to working systems. 
4.4.1 Examples Employing the Interoperability Architecture. 
There are many approaches to integrating a simulator into an 
integrated DIS exercise which fit within the framework outlined 
above . From an architectural point of view, the following list 
enumerates a variety of possible simulator organizations, all of 
which are appropriate for meeting DIS interoperability 
requirements: 
a simulator and its DIS communication interface can coexist 
on a single host computer. 
a single host can run multiple simulations, using the same 
or different DIS host identities for these entities . 
a dedicated processor front end can be used for implementing 
the communication interoperability (as well as other DIS) 
requirements for one or more back end simulators. This 
approach is sometimes referred to as an "application 
gateway". One of the primary advantages to this approach is 
minimal interference with currently operational simulators. 
The interconnection of the application gateway with the 
simulator is not subject to the DIS standardization effort. 
A reasonable implementation of such a component might be 
useable by various classes of simulator. 
a simUlation implementation can span multiple computers, 
either as part of a multiprocessor system, locally 
distributed, or even with geographically distributed 
components. with such arrangements, from the vantage point 
of the network, a single component is designated as 
representing the simUlation in its entirety. Any 
information distribution among the components is entirely 
the responsibility of the simulator. 
Figure 3 illustrates the variety of interconnection modes 
which can be supported by the communication architecture approach 





















A wide variety of 
interconnection 
approaches 
, 7= vehicle sim 
R = router 
AG = application 
gateway 

























4.5 Communication Management Requirements 
4.5.1 Network Ma agement. The approach to n e t wo rk 
management is usually dependent upon the type o f ne t work 
employed. Thus, there is a generally recognized and sa n c t ioned 
way to manage an OSI b ased network, in the form of OSI network 
management protocols and service definitions. Similarly, a n 
Internet based networ is typically managed by Internet network 
management protocols. In analyzing the requirements for network 
management posed by distributed interactive simul a t i on, the 
conclusion is that thl2 requirements are no different tha n for a 
non-simulation network . Hence, the most prudent course of a c tion 
would be to adopt the network management approach that comes with 
the protocol suite selected for handling interoperability . 
4.5.1.1 Basic Functions. Exercise communications management 
is a set of facilities to monitor and control the networks that 
join simulators and other DIS components at a site a nd sites wi th 
each other. By monito ring we mean the ability to determine the 
status of a network component. By control we mean the ability t o 
set parameters of a network component. The monitoring and 
control of network components is often referred to as "network 
management". 
DIS requirements for network management a re essenti a ll y the 
same as for any other distributed application. One can think o f 
an exercise as having two phases, initialization and opera tion. 
During the initializaotion phase, one would use network manag e me nt 
monitoring facilities to check the status of lines, hos t 
interfaces, routers, a nd other network components required for 
the exercise. Control functions would be used to boot device s 
with the appropriate parameters, enable interfaces, a nd so on. 
The exact set of functions used would depend on the equipment 
being used, the extent to which its configura tion c a n be change d, 
and the nature of the network or networks involved. 
During operation of an exercise, network management 
functions would be used to detect and troubleshoot problems . 
Monitoring functions are used to detect apparent connectivity o r 
equipment failures. Once a problem is detected, operators selec t 
appropriate monitoring functions to retrieve paramete r v a lues o r 
other information needed to determine the exact cause. Finally, 
operators can use control functions to reboot equipment, activa t e 
alternate interfaces, or take other corrective action. As is the 
case for initialization, the exact functions used would depend on 
the nature of the prob lem, the equipment, and of the networks 
involved. 
It should be note d that some facets of network operation are 
not typically automated or performed remotely. For example, a 
network operator might command the use of a dial-up line, but the 





















Also, while a network operator might command the use of back-up 
equipment when primary equipment fails , it is sometimes necessary 
for a technician to remove and replace failed components. 
4.5.1.2 Potential Implementation Mechanisms. DIS shall use 
standard network management protocols to manage the 
communications infrastructure. Simple Network Management 
Protocol (SNMP) is a network management protocol frequently used 
in conjunction with the Transmission Control Protocol 
(TCP)/Internet Protocol (IP) stack . Common Management 
Information Services (CMIS)/Common Management Information 
Protocol (CMIP) is used in an Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) 
environment. The choice of network management protocol would 
depend on the other protocols (TCP/IP or OSI) being used in the 
network. 
4.6 Network Security Requirements. Security pertains to 
the protection of data that is transferred on the network . I t 
may not be necessary for all applications of DIS to r e quire 
security services. The need for security measures within a given 
DIS network depends primarily on the requirements of its users. 
Any implementor of DIS should give careful consideration to the 
security requirements of the application. For those applications 
which require some level of security protection, guidance will be 
provided in future versions of this standard. See Appendix C for 









































5. DETAILED REQUIREMENTS 
5.1 DIS Communication Architecture. section 4.3 defines 
the protocol suites that shall be used in the phased approach for 
the DIS Communications Architecture. In order to guarantee the 
smooth transition from one phase to the next, this section will 
address the detail requirements and the migration of each phase. 
5.1.1 Phase Zero - Initial Internet Archi t ecture . The 
Phase 0 architecture is based on Internet network products and 
communications service which are available today and ca n be used 
to support current exercises and early implementations of DI S 
applications. At each site, there is an Ethernet (I EEE 802.3 ) 
Local Area Network (LAN) with a local broadcast capability. For 
testing, demonstrations, and exercises involving multiple sites, 
the LANs will be interconnected using a wide area network that 
can provide the required communications services at those 
locations . The Phase 0 architecture is shown in Figure 4. 
Each simulator has IP with both UDP and TCP. UDP is used to 
support not only the simulation application, but also the NTP and 
SNMP. TCP is used to support FTP, Telnet, and SMTP. Telnet is 
needed for remote debugging and for configuration management 
chores. FTP is needed for retrieval of databases. E-mail is not 
really needed on the simulators, but may be convenient to have on 
some simulation machines. 
As part of the standard operation of IP-over-Ethernet, the 
mapping between IP-addresses (single and multicast) and the 
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Figure 4. Phase 0: Internet Architecture 
5.1 . 2 Phase One - Hybrid Internet/OSI Architecture. The 
Phase 1 hybrid architecture is based on OSI network p r oducts 
which are available today. Interim wide area network facilities 
are used as in Phase O. The Phase 1 architecture is shown in 
Figure 5. Phase 1 represents a possible interim transition s tep 
for DIS applications that start with Phase 0 and are migrating to 
Phase 2. In addition, systems that are under development using 









































membership management, group initiation, and group c ommunica t i on 
termination. 
The following items are considered developmental based on 
product availability: multicast (ST-II), group management, and 
CLTP. 
5.1 .2.1 Migration Path to Phase One. The transition from 
Phase 0 to Phase 1 will require protocols at all lev e ls to 
change. The protocol migration is shown in Table VI. 
TABLE VI. Transition From Phase 0 to Phase 1 
Phase 0 Phase 1 
Internet Standards OSI/Hybrid Standards 
SNMP -- > CMIP 
NTP --> modified NTP 
TELNET -- > VTP 
FTP -- > FTAM 
SMTP -- > MHS 
TCP -- > TP4 
UDP --> CLTP 
IP -- > CLNP 
Open -- > ST-II 
XTP 
5.1.2.2 Migration Process to Phase One. Two types of 
milestones can be used to determine when the transition from 
Phase 0 to Phase 1 should occur. The first set of milestones are 
the "maturity criteria" which includes: protocol maturity, 
product availability, product maturity, product cost, a nd 
implementations. The second set of milestones, "risk criteria", 
include: required development and development cost. 
5.1.3 Phase Two - Full OS1/GOS1P Architecture. 
proposed Phase 2 architecture incorporates the future 
multicast protocols into the GOS1P compliant network. 











































TABLE VII. Tra nsition From Phase 1 to Phase 2 
Phase 1 Phase 2 














CMIP w/multicast extensions 
OSI Time Protocol 
TP5 
MPMC 
5.1.3.2 Migration Process to Phase Two. The transition 
from Phase 1 to Phase 2 should be based on the multicast 
protocols being standardized by ISO. After adoption, the 
functionality of the new protocols should be demonstrated and 
tested in prototype implementations. Once testing is completed 
and the protocols have been validated, the new architecture 
should be assessed by the maturity criteria establi shed for the 






















6.1 Role of the Communication Architecture. The OSI 
Reference Model is probably the most widely referenced 
communication architecture model, and we adopt its use here. 
Under this model, the communication interconnection problem is 
broken down into seven layers, each with specific responsibility 
in carrying out part of the overall communication integration. 
The development of this reference model was in large measure 
motivated by and patterned after the success of the DARPA 
Internet program, which was the pioneer of the general machine 
interconnection technology base. Along with the development of 
the reference model, OSI has developed a series of protocols 
which in some cases mirror comparable entities in the Internet, 
and in other cases extend and formalize concepts only primitively 
developed by the Internet program. Currently, there are two 
dominant suites of protocols (Internet and OSI) which fit within 
the Reference Model communication architecture and are 
instantiations of a solution to the general communication 
interoperability problem. They differ in their details, in their 
maturity, in their number of options, in their flexibility, in 
their performance, in their number of currently available 
commercial products, in their number of fielded systems, and in 
their organizational support, among other factors. 
within level 3 of this reference model there is 
functionality which is key to a generalized interconnection 
model. This so called "internet level" provides for packets of 
information to be transparently delivered from system to system 
across almost arbitrary interconnections of local and wide area 
networks. By adopting the low cost conventions of providing for 
remote delivery even when delivery is actually local, and through 
the provision of gateway processors linking the local and wide 
area networks, a single approach (from the application 
perspective) can handle both the local and global cases, as well 
as transparently handle any needed change from one to the other. 
Under this approach, any reasonable selection for the layers 
below will be perfectly acceptable and work. These decisions 
can be handled locally on a case by case basis or by policy over 
some administrative domain if deemed appropriate. Since building 
to the level three interface admits a mixing and matching 
approach to all of the levels below without sacrificing 
interoperability. Levels above do need to be matched. However, 
in our immediate case, handling interoperability for these 
functional elements has already been subsumed into the current 
DIS PDU standard. This approach ensures the maximum 
interoperability with the minimum of specification and new 
development. 
6.2 Generalized Functional Architecture. The 
Communications community thinks in terms of a vertical layer i ng 





















by the International Standards Organ iza t i on) refers to seven 
layers. Table VIII identifies the levels and illustrates their 
meaning in the context of the networking of simulators. 










Kind of data exchanged (position, 
o r ientation, ... ) 
Dead reckoning rules. 
Rules on determining hit or miss a nd damage. 
o f position (local vs geocentri c coordi nates) 
o f orientation (Euler angles, Quaternions, 
SPV) units: English, metri c , degrees , BAMs . 
encoding: integer vs float, big vs little 
e ndian. 
Procedure for starting and ending an 
e xercise. Rules for joining and leaving a n 
exercise. 
Freeze. 
Addressing from end user to end user . 
Assuring communications reliability, if 
required. 
Addressing information from node to node. 
Fr aming of information on a physical link. 
Fl ags, zero bit insertion. Conflic t 
resolution. 
Wi re, optical fiber, radio transmission. 
Voltage levels, impedance values, clock 
rates. 
The DIS POD document addresses levels 5 through 7 . It does 
so without separating the levels. Levels 4 a nd below are defined 
in the remainder of this section. 
There are a variety of existing protocols and i nter faces 
which populate the functiona l areas for levels 1-4. The two most 
prominent suites of protocols which are collectively put forth as 
solutions to the interoperab i lity problem are the 000 (Internet) 
su i te and the 081 (GOSIP) su i te. At this stage of evolution, 
the two are conceptually simi lar, but vary considerably in the 
details and in maturity. Both suites emphasize the network 
transparency from level 3 and above, as discussed previously. 
This means that one simulator is completely isolated fr om the 





















collection of simulators, by adopting one of the "internetwork" 
layer standards as the base level for interoperability. Thi s 
provides the freedom to delegate to local decision making th e 
protocols used for the lower levels (assuming the selections 
conform with overall, real time performance objectives). The 
current real work of this document focuses essentially on l evels 
3 and 4. A plan which starts from the more mature Internet suite 
and evolves as appropriate over time toward the GOSIP suite is 
the most prudent path at this time. 
6.3 OSI Compatibility. The OSIRM was developed in 1977 by 
the International Organization for Standardization in response to 
the need to interconnect heterogeneous computers. OSI defines a 
framework for the interaction of users and applications in a 
distributed environment. 
The Government Open Systems Interconnection Profile is the 
u.s. Government program for adoption of OSI across all Federal 
agencies . The purpose of GOSIP is to provide: networki ng 
connectivity , through GOSIP network architecture; 
interoperability, through standard "profiles" of OSI protocols; 
and competition, through focus on small number o f subnetwork 
technologies and interoperable applications. 
6.3.1 Desired Extensions & Additions to OSlo The DIS 
multicast requirement is not presently found in OSI, however, 
work is underway to develop these standards. Currently, there 
are six American National Standards Institute (ANSI) working 
groups participating in the development of multicast standards: 
X3T5.l (OSI Architecture), X3T5 .4 (OSI Management), X3T5 .5 (OSI 
Upper Layers), X3T5.7 (OSI Security), X3S3.3 (Network and 
Transport Layers), and X3S3.7 (Public Data Networks). The goal 
of the Multipeer/ Multicast (MPMC) effort ·is to develop a complete 
set of standards which will provide DIS with a full range of 
multicast functions a nd capabilities. 
To include multipeer/ multicast in the OSIRM, are required 
the following extensions and additions to current I SO s t a ndards : 
as! Reference Model, including Part 1: Multipeer Addendum to 
the Basic Reference Model, Part 2: security, Part 3 : Naming 
and Addressing, and Part 4: Management Framework; 
Application Layer, including the Application Layer Structure 
and Extended Application Layer Structure; 
Transport Layer, including Connectionless Transport Protocol 
and Connection Oriented Transport Protocol; 
Network Layer, including Connectionless Network Protocol, 
X.25 Packet Level Protocol for Data Terminal Equipment, X. 25 





















Routing, including End System to Intermediate System 
Protocol (ES-IS), Intermediate System to Intermediate System 
Protocol (IS-IS), and Intra-Domain Routing Protocol (IDRP) 
Data Link, including X.25 LAPB Compatible DTE Data Link 
Procedures; and 
Network Management, including Common Management Information 
Service (CMIS), Common Management Information Protocol 
(CMIP), Systems Management Overview, OSI System Management, 
and Structure of Management Information 
Other extensions to the OSI architecture include a time 
protocol. The Navy's SAFENET project is currently modifying the 
Internet Network Time Protocol (NTP) , designed for Transmission 
Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) networks, to run on 
an OSI stack. This work is being forwarded to the appropriate 









































































































10 Communication Arch itecture Pro f il e For Phase 0 
This communication architecture uses the 000 fa mi l y o f 
protocols is based on IP, with TCP (MIL-STO-177 8 ) f o r r e liable 
communication and UOP for real-time communication . 
10.1 Exercise Management. In each simul a tion si te there are 
several simulators and a Local Exercise Manager (LEM) , a ll 
interconnected by a LAN, to which we r efer as "Et herne t II, even 
though it may be FOOl or other LANs. 
The LEM is a software module, wh i ch does no t need dedicated 
hardware, and may be implemented on any of the simu lators , for 
example. The LEM i s in communica tion with othe r LEMs , a nd i n 
particular with the Global Exercise Ma nager (GEM) for the pu r pose 
of coordinating the entire exercise. 
Afte r the LEMs agree about the p a r a mete r s o f a n exe r c i se 
they communicate them to a ll the p a rt i cipating s i mula t o r s , usi ng 
a "session-level" type communication. This s etup i ncl udes t h e 
identifications of all the simulators involve d in t h e exercise , 
their r oles, the exact presentation schemes to b e u sed , t h e exac t 
geographic database to be used, the ma x imal bandwi d th tha t each 
simulator is allowed to load on the ne twork, a nd the 
IP-multicast-addresses (IPMCA) assigned to the entire exerc ise . 
10.2 Communication setup. The s etup communica t ion, betwee n 
the LEM and the simulators is conducted by using Telne t over TCP 
(over I P, over Ethernet). The setup process may use both manual 
and automatic procedures. As a part of the genera l setup, 
database files (e.g., geographic) are loaded, by u s ing FTP 
(MIL-STO-1780), from designated director i es. FTP a lso ope r a tes 
over TCP (over I P, over the Ethernet). The r ea l- time 
commun i cation (e~g., of POUs) is carri ed by UO P . These packe t s 
are encapsulated inside Ethernet packets. The ent i r e 
configuration is managed (and verified) by u s ing SNMP i n the 
simulators. This allows a remote network mana geme nt process t o 
check the status of e a ch simulator. 
In each case, of the real-time simulation messages a r e 
broadca st to a ll the participants in the e xercise , local l y ove r 
the Etherne t, and remotely over WANs. 
It is expected that future simulators will r e qu ire t i me 
synchronization. This ma y be achieved by using the Interne t t i me 
synchronization protocol (a.k.a. the Network Time Pr otocol, NT P) , 
over UOP, on the Ethernet. The time protocol i s def ined in 
RFC111 9 a nd RFC112 9 . 
The real-time communication for the suppor t of dis tributed 
interactive simulation requires that a given bandwidth is 






















required both broadcast and bandwidth performance guarantee s . 
Phase 0 only has a requirement for broadcast, so multicast i s not 
an issue in this profile. Since these issues (bandwidth+delay 
and broadcast) are at the network level (level-3 of the ISORM) it 
is possible to address them at the gateway between the LAN and 
the WAN. If the WAN provide these services there is no need for 
this gateway to be involved. However, in the most general c a se 
this gateway should handle them. In cases that the Commercial 
Off The Shelf (COTS) gateways and WANs do not provide this 
functionality it can be achieved it by adding a front-end to the 
gateway on a general purpose computer, preferably with two 
Ethernet interfaces to allow inserting this front-end "in series " 
with the gateway. 
To guarantee interoperability each simulator should comply 
with the Host-Requirement, as specified in "Requirements for 
Internet hosts - communication layers" (RFCl122) and in 
"Requirements for Internet hosts - application and support" 
(RFCl123). This would guarantee the "invisible support " as 
required for interoperability (including ARP, re-direct, etc.) 
A good source of information is "Perspective on the Host 
Requirements RFCs" (RFCl127). 
+------------+ +--------+ 
: Simulation: : Setup : 
+------+ +-----+ +------------+ +--------+ +-----+ +-------+ 
: SNMP I I NTP I I Presentation I I Telnet I I FTP I I Email I 
+------+--+-----+--+------------+ +--------+--+-----+--+-------+ 
IUD P I I T C P I 
I I I I 
+-------------------------------+--+----------------------------+ 
I I P I 
I I 
+---------------------------------------------------------------+ 
: ETHERNET I 
+---------------------------------------------------------------+ 
I 500hm coax I I I 
+---------------------------------------------------------------+ 
Figure 7. The Protocol Structure in the Simulators 
Notes: 
* The ISORM level of the Ethernet is 2, of IP is 3, and of TCP 
and UDP is 4. The ISO level of the simulation is 7, and i t s 
presentation level is 6. 
* The simulation session level , 5, does not show e xplicitly. 






















20 Security Architecture Profile for Phase o. 
The Phase 0 Distributed Interactive Simulation sce nario 
consists of multiple IP-based simulators, in each of several 
sites, participating in a real-time exercise. Each site uses a 
LAN like an Ethernet or FDDI which could be interconnected 
securely via a black WAN to the other sites. Some of the 
simulators, at some sites, will participate in a given exercise, 
at a system-high level, using a red LAN, i.e., all the 
subscribers to that LAN will have access to all the traffic 
associated with the exercise. The system-high opera t ion may 
interfere with the ability of a site to participa te in several 
independently secure exercises simultaneously. 
At each site there will be a Local Exercise Manager (LEM) . 
The LEM is a software process that wi l l participate in the set up 
of that exercise and would know which other sites participate . 
It would also distribute specific parameter values for each 
exercise (such as the bandwidth allocated to the site, update 
frequency, the choice of coordinate system, and the version of 
the geographic database in use). It is anticipated that some 
manual set up will be required initia l ly for each exercise, 
either of a new type, or with a new set of participants. 
The LEM will use TCP to communicate with each of the 
simulators, with LEMs at other sites, and with the GEM, the 
Global Exercise Manager. The individual simulators will use TCP 
(with FTP) for reliable loading of critical files, such as 
programs and geographic databases. The real-time communicat ion 
among the simulators during the exercise will use UDP. 
For security considerations the LEM is divided into separate 
black and red components. 
The WANs may, or may not, support bandwidth rese rva tion and 
multicast, such as the TWBnet. For generality the assumption is 
made that the WANs support neither. The example addressed here 
represents the worst case sce nario. Two-by-two approaches have 
to be considered: 
and 
(H) System-high operation 
(C) Controlled access to exercises 
(2) Network security at Level-2 
(J) Network security at Level-J 
For the total of four approaches: 
(H.2) System-high operation based 
Level-2 
(H.J) System-high operation based 
Level-J 
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(C. 2) : 
(C.3): 
Controlled access based on network security at 
Level-2 
Controlled access based on network security at 
Level-3 
We assume that initially (H. X) , system-high operation at 
Level-2 or at Level-3, would be used with encryption devices 
site, regardless of the number of simulators there. This is 
because of the understanding that eventually the system will 
migrate to (C. X) , controlled local access to exercises, with 
individual encryption devices for all the simulators 
participating in the exercise , and for the red LEM. 
per 
done 
The migration from (H.X) to (C.X) will require some 
development costs, with no significant implications for the 
architecture, the software, or the hardware. This will require 
the addition of another network encryption device and a red LEM 
per local physically separated community of interest (i.e., using 
a separate encryption key when leaving their system high LAN). 
. For maximal flexibility there may be a dedicated encryption 
device for each host. However, the budget may not be able to 
support a large number of such security devices since the cost of 
NSA-approved encryption devices does not follow the trend of 
consumer electronics (commercial computers, included) and does 
not decrease dramatically annually. 
In principle, approaches (H.2) and (H.3) are similar, eve n 
though they differ in many details. For brevity we describe here 
only (H.2). This is not a recommendation to prefer (H.2) over 
(H.3), (C.2), or (C.3). 
The actual choice among (H.2) and (H.3) and among the 
various devices available on the market (through the Commercial 
COMSEC Endorsement Program (CCEP), of National Security Agency 
(NSA)) could be made only after objective engineering tradeoffs 
are taken into account. Considerations of interest include: 
* Performance (both in bps and pps) 
* Keying 
* security management 
* Multicast (and crypto synchronization), 
* Real-time behavior (and packet loss) 
* Security doctrine (modes/policy) 
* Configuration 
* Error response 
* Error characteristics 
* Scalability 
* Network management 
* Interaction with other protocols and services (e. g ., 
Redirect, ARP, and SQ) 






















20.1 Approach-(H.2): System-High at Level-2. Figure 8 
shows the configuration. The local system-high LAN support s the 
simulators. The encryption is performed at the Eth e rn e t l ev e l, 
by Xerox's XED. 
The LEM job is divided among two units, the Black-LEM (B-
LEM) and the Red-LEM (R-LEM). The configuration information that 
is entered into the B-LEM is then distributed over airgaps to the 
R-LEM, to the Ethernet bridge, and to the KML (for the XED). It 
is also distributed to the Reno (a.k.a. XET, the front end for 
the gateway, see later) over .a black-LAN. The R-LEM is on the 
red system-high LAN. The B-LEM cannot be on the red LAN beca u s e 
it has to provide information to the black Reno. Neither part of 
the LEM requires a dedicated hardware unit. Both are softwa re 
modules that can be run at a user level, the B-LEM on th e bl ac k 
side (e.g., in a Reno) and the R-LEM on the red side (e . g., on 
any simulator). R-LEMs communicate with other R-LEMs, only i n a 
secure mode over the WAN once the appropriate keying arrangeme nt s 
are made. B-LEMs can always talk with each other over the WAN in 
an unsecured mode. 
Each exercise has its own IP Multicast Address (IPMCA) (and 
Ethernet Multicast Address (EMCA)) used for all the communica tion 
with the other simulators, at the other sites. The transmiss ion 
scenario, after the initial set up is as follows. Pl e a s e con s ult 
the diagram of (H.2), below. 
20.1.1 Example Scenarios. Each simulator prepares dat a f or 
transmission, in red DDPjIP packets, addressed to the IPMCA 
assigned to the exercise. These red packets leave the simulator 
into the red LAN using the EMCA9 • (The IPMCA was provided 
earlier by the R-LEM to the simulators (using TCP).) 
An Ethernet-bridge, B, on the LAN transfers only the red 
packets with the EMCA to the XED. The EMCA was provided earlier 
to the bridge by the B-LEM10 • 
The XEU verifies that the originating host (identi f i e d by 
its individual Ethernet address) is indeed authori zed to se nd r e d 
packets to this EMCA. The EMCA and the list of the Eth e rn e t 
addresses of all the authorized simulators should have been 
provided earlier by the B-LEM via the Key Managerj Loa d e r (KLM) 
to the XED. The XED generates the black version of the se red 
9 The EMCA is derived from the IPMCA according to the 
standard IP operation procedures as defined in RFCll12, "Host 
extensions for IP Multicasting", by S.E. Deering, Aug-01-1 989 . 
10 
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packets, by encrypting them in their entirety, by adding it s ow n 
headers (for crypto synchronization, etc.), and also by a dding 
black Ethernet headers with the original EMCA in the bl a ck. 
The KML is physically located at one site (per exercise) 
It generates physical keys that have to be distributed to th e 
sites. New keys have to be distributed to all sites from the KML 
at least once a year unless security compromises occur. Whenever 
a site adds devices with new Ethernet addresses (e.g., new 
simulators) it would require a new key to be generated for th a t 
site only for the exercises in which these new device s a re t o 
participate. 
The packets are then given by the XED, over the black 
Ethernet, to the Reno, that operates totally in the black" 
The Reno recognizes the exercise packets by their EMCA a nd 
encapsulates them in IP (or ST) packets, as required by the 
gateway to the WAN. These packets are IP-addressed (or 
ST-addressed) to Renos at the other participating sites. Being a 
general purpose computer the Reno can easily be programmed to set 
the priority field, or to open a connection with bandwidth 
reservation, as required. The black Reno packets are sent over 
the black LAN to the black gateway for transmission over black 
WANs. That gateway should be a COTS unit, optimized for the WAN 
in use. 
It is possible for a sending Reno to strip off the black 
Ethernet headers for the transmission over the WAN, to be 
re-inserted by the receiving Reno. This saves some WAN bandwidth 
at a cost of additional processing (a typical engineering 
tradeoff). If an IP-WAN does not support IP-multicast, the Reno 
can replicate the black packets to achieve the desired mUlticast. 
The IP-addresses to which the packets should be forwarded were 
provided earlier by the B-LEM to the Reno, over the black LAN. 
All the knowledge about the WAN is in the Reno, because the 
WAN connects (practically) only the Renos. Hence, issues such a s 
the choice of IP vs. ST for the long haul are separated by the 
Renos from the rest of the system that uses IP for end-to-end 
communication. Note that because of the security there is no 
" The Reno (a.k.a. XET is a software package developed by 
Xerox, that can run on any general purpose computer (e.g. any 38 6 
system or a SPARC). The function of the Reno is to serve as a 
front-end for the gateway, by encapsulating the black Ethernet 
packets (produced by the XED) inside black packets suitable f or 
handling by the WAN, and by performing the inverse task at the 
receiver end. If needed, the Reno may perform the gateway front-





















direct interaction between the end-to-end IP and the IP that is 
used over the WAN. These two IPs do not have to share eve n their 
address space. 
Therefore, changing the WAN (say from a genera l IP-network , 
to a TWBnet, to its future successors, and then to a gigabit 
speed IP-network) could be handled by changes only to the Reno. 
As advances in technology (and especially in DoD 
procurement) make better networks available, only the gateway 
selection and some Reno software may have to be modified, 
isolating the local site, the simulators, the LEMs, and the 
encryption gear from the need to adapt to the upgrading of the 
WANs. 
The reception scenario, after the initial set up is as 
follows. Please consult the diagram of (H.2), (Figu re 8) below . 
The black WAN deliver black packets to the Reno over th e 
black Ethernet. The Reno recognizes them, by their IPMCAs (or by 
their ST addresses) as belonging to a particular exercise, 
de-encapsulates them from the IP (or ST) packets, and gets the 
black Ethernet packets with the appropriate headers as expected 
by the XED. These packets are delivered over the black Ethernet 
to the XED, that decrypts them and recovers the original red 
Ethernet packets, with the original EMCA. 
The XED transmits these red packets on the red system-high 
Ethernet, through the bridge, and makes them available to all the 
local simulators, where the Ethernet headers are disca rded, a nd 
the original red DDP/IP packets are received and processed . 
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Notes for the (H.2) diagram: 
Diskettes are used to carry information from the B-LEM to 
the R-LEM and to the KML, if it's at that site. The setting 
of the bridge depends on the particular bridge in use. 
The KML exists only in a few locations. Only one KML is in 
charge of any exercise. It generates the keys for all th e 
participants in that exercise, and from it they have to be 
securely distributed to the various sites. 
If needed, for performance, the Reno may use two Ethernet 
interfaces to allow splitting the black Ethernet, with one 
segment between the XEU and the Reno, and another for the 
WAN gateway(s), the B-LEM, and the Reno. This makes the 
LAN, the bridge, the XEU, the Reno, and the Gateway to be 
"in-series", as shown in the following diagram. 
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10 Factors which influence OIS bandwidth. There are a 
number of factors which have a major influence on OIS bandwidth. 
At the very highest level, they include: 
Total number of entities 
Mixture of entity types. 
Type of exercise or scenario 
Choice of dead reckoning algorithm (and 
positional/angular thresholds) 
security requirements 
For the current setQf approved OIS POUs, the ma jority of 
network traffic will to Entity state POUs (ESPOUs). ESPOU s a r e 
required to be sent at some minimum rate (e.g. every 5 second s ) 
by every entity and may be sent much more frequently depending 
on entity dynamics. The start-up of a session will also see high 
traffic but that is deterministic. The POUs used to initialize 
an exercise or entity (such as the recommended Activate POUs) 
represent a significant amount of data to be sent via the net, 
but they can be transmitted at a controlled rate. In the near 
term, the inclusion of Emitter POUs may add a significant tra f f i c 
load to the network, depending on the degree of electronic 
warfare (EW) present in a given exercise. Similarly the future 
inclusion of simulated tactical communication links (both voi ce 
and data) will undoubtedly have a sUbstantial impact on 
bandwidth. 
In addition to the above there are also additional bandwidth 
requirements due to communications "overhead". A given POU of 
"n" bits in length requires the addition of both headers and 
trailers in order to satisfy routing and data integrity 
requirements . The proposed UOP/IP protocols add 32 bytes (8 f or 
UOP and 24 for IP). The underlying media adds furth e r overhead, 
such as FOOl's 20 to 28 bytes of preamble, header and trailer 
information . A method to reduce this load is to concatenate POU s 
at the application layer such that the overhead bits a r e a ppl i e d 
to groups of POUs rather than to every POU. Thi s a pp r oach, 
however, imposes an additional computational load on each ho s t. 
This trade-off of processing load vs network traffic requires 
further study before serious recommendations can be made. 
Another source of "overhead" traffic are security measure s . 
The degree of overhead depends on at what layer (of the OSI s even 
layer stack) the security measures are implemented. 
10.1 Estimating Exercise Bandwidth Requirements. In 
general, there is no single set of formulae for accurately 
estimating the bandwidth requirements of any given OIS exerc i se 
since , by nature, they have a combination of man- i n-the-loop a nd 
non-deterministic simulated adversaries. As such, e ach entity i n 
a given exercise generates network traffic at a varying rat e . 






















entity with others. For example any vehicle that is in transit 
to or from its assigned duty area will exhibit very predic t able 
dynamics and therefore generate low network traffic. Conversely, 
an entity entering into conflict or close cooperation with 
another will typically generate a high level of traffic. In both 
cases the traffic is a result of the frequency at which the POUs 
are generated, while the size of the individual POUs remain 
relatively stable. Estimating sizes of POUs for selected entity 
types is a comparatively straightforward process while estimating 
the frequency at which they are generated is fairly complex a nd 
more sUbjective. 
As stated earlier the Entity state POU will be the main 
source of network traffic. There are currently nine other POU 
types required by the DIS standard, with several others 
recommended. Of the nine required, six are related to logistics 
(e.g. repair and resupply) and are expected to occur so 
infrequently as to have little or no effect on network bandwidth 
requirements. Another, the Collision POU, also falls into this 
category. The remaining two are the Fire POU (FPOU) and 
Detonation POU (OPOU), and conceivably can occur frequently 
enough at certain stages of battle to be considered in bandwidth 
calculations. In addition, the Emitter POD (EPOU), one of the 
emerging recommended messages, is likely to be a major 
contributor in the near future . These four POU types have the 
following formula for determining their sizes (in bit s ): 
PDU FORMULA REMARKS 
ESPDU 1152+128A where A= # of articulated part 
FPDU 704 records 
DPDU 800+128H H= # of articulated parts 
hit 
EPDU 192+E(160+B(304+96T)) E= # of emitters 
B= # of beams per emitter 
T= # of targets per beam 
Given the above, it is possible to estimate the POU sizes 
for classes of entity types. For example, for a given type of 
tank the minimum number o f articulated part records may be 5 
(azimuth and azimuth rate for turret, elevation of th e barrel, 
and up/down position for two hatches) and the number of emitters 
1 (laser range finder). For a fighter aircraft the number of 
articulated parts could easily be 20 (8 weapon stations, 2 drop 
tank stations, 6 vertical control surfaces, 2 horizontal control 
surfaces, landing gear, and speed brake) with 3 emitters (radar, 
jammer, and laser designator). Similar assumptions can be made 
regarding surface ships. The following table present s estimates 
























































The next step in estimating the bandwidth requirements of a 
given exercise is to approximate the rates at which each entity 
class will issue each of the above POU types. Since this rate can 
vary a great deal within a given exercise, one method of 
estimation is to give values representing some average low and 
high rates. The final step is to determine the number of each 
major entity type which will participate in the exercise. Given 
all of these factors, the determination of a range of probable 
network traffic can be easily calculated. Figure 10 presents an 
example of such an analysis for three different types of 
exercises. The examples include tactical voice and data links as 
sources of network traffic (65 Kbs for each voice channel and 
actual values for Link-4A, Link-11, and Link-16). Figure 11 
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As shown in the figures, the network traffic can vary as 
much as ten to one depending on the relative number o f e ntit ies 
which are in a high dynamic environment. The low end o f the 
charts are certainly the minimum bandwidth require me nts si nce 
they are based on all e ntities in a quiescent mode ( i. e . ESPDUs 
only once every 5 seconds). The high ends of the c har t s a r e more 
sUbjective since it makes assumptions as to the ma ximum ra t es 
each entity type will exhibit, but in any case are not pro b a b le 
since they represent all entities simultaneously enga g ed in heavy 
combat. Given those assumptions, such charts may b e u sed as a 
guide to sizing a network for any type of exercise. 
Some final points to be made about the above di scuss ion: 
The sample bandwidth value s shown a re onl y f o r 
illustration, and should not be used in formal 
s pec ifica tions . 
The Emitter PDU used here is in accorda nce wi th the 
latest format proposed by the Emissions Subgroup, not 
the format shown in the existing version o f the DI S 
specification. This latest version results i n l e s s 
overa ll network traffic since it is only i ssu e d on 
change of the emitter data (the older version had to b e 
issued at lea st as often as ESPDUs). 
The a nalysis does not account for the tra nsi t ory 
existence of entities in the form of gu i d ed weapo ns 
released by various types of weapon systems . These 
will add still further traffic and will mo s t likely be 
present during the same period of time where high 
vehicle dynamics are also occurring - during engage ment 
of groups of opposing forces. 
No data compression is assumed. For reduction of PDU 
traffic it is not considered viable at this time due to 
the large computational load it would pl a c e upon each 
entity host computer. It should b e serious l y 
considered for tactical voice links, howeve r, si nce the 
task is simplified by the fact that the computer d oes 
not need to know what is actually i n a v o ice message ; 
the compression and decompression can then be do ne by 
hardware, external to the computer system. Th e signa l 
can be compressed by hardware at the source, sent over 
the network in its compressed form, and fed direc tly to 
decompression hardware at the listener. A v a riety of 
commercial devices currently exist to support this, 
some offering time stamping of the audio stream fo r 
synchroni zation. Standards are emerging wi th th e 
growth of multimed i a computing technology , a nd cou ld be 






















10.2 Estimating Traffic in terms of POUs and Packets per 
Second. Once it has been established that the underlying media 
is capable of handling network traffic (i.e. from the bits per 
second standpoint), the next figure of merit to analyze is that 
of the number of messages to be handled in a given unit of time. 
This factor provides a relative figure-of-merit for the type of 
processing power necessary for a given set of communications 
protocols. 
Figure 12 presents another look at the sample exercise data 
presented earlier. Here, in addition to the total traffic for 
each exercise in bits per second there are two additional fields 
showing the number of POUs per second as well as packets per 
second. The following assumptions were made in developing these 
estimates: 





POUs can be concatenated such that each packet contains 
several POUs. The POU sizes here are taken to be 
without overhead bits; a single set of overhead bits is 
applied to the entire packet. 
The "host" composing the packets always waits until the 
1500 byte limit is filled. In actual practice the 
efficiency factor will probably be lower (to avoid 
excessive latency), resulting in an actual packet rate 
that falls somewhere between the two values (POUs/ sec 
and packets/sec) shown. 
voice packets are produced at 32 Hz, Link-11 and Link-
4A at 4 Hz, and Link-16 (JTIOS) at 16 Hz. 
69 
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10. Introduction. The goal of this section is to identify 
a number of security requirements made evident by the broad 
outlines of DIS, and by common understanding regarding the 
environment in which DIS will perform. The section will also 
give a thumbnail sketch of the world of information security, so 
that our problems can be seen in a larger perspective. This 
section is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of DIS 
security requirements. Such requirements will be a complex 
function of the system itself as it evolves, a nd of the need s of 
its primary intended users. 
20. A Security Vocabulary. Arguably the most important 
task in defining a security specification for DIS is the 
acceptance of a common vocabulary for discussing security issues . 
The most widely accepted system so far developed is the 000 
Trusted Computer Systems Evaluation criteria (TCSEC), and its 
follow on "interpretations" for Networking , Secure Database 
Standards, and Integrity criteria. TCSEC is also known as the 
Orange Book, while the Trusted Network criteria (TNI) is known as 
the Red Book. These works have both popularized a nd made explicit 
such terms as "Security Policy", "Multilevel Security", 
"Discretionary Access Control", "Trusted Path", etc., as well as 
the familiar rating categories Cl, C2, Bl, B2, B3, AI . 
The National Computer Security center (NCSC) actually 
undertakes to evaluate and certify production systems according 
to these criteria. The certification process is long, expensive, 
and uncertain, with relatively few corporations submitting their 
products (much less completing the process) . 
For many environments, including military ones , uncertified 
systems can provide usable and reliable security features, and 
frequently comprise the only option. Certainly it is true that a 
systems designer's choices are extremely limited if he chooses to 
utilize only NCSC-certified products. The bright side of the 
picture is that choices are becoming far more numerous . 
There are many good reasons for using the 000 security 
vocabulary. For one thing, it is fairly explicit, a nd addresses , 
in one form or another, virtually every conceivable aspec t of 
computer security. It is not necessary to commit to the 
evaluation categories, or to specific formulas of risk 
assessment , to benefit from the vocabulary, concepts, a nd 
methodologies which have been developed. In addition , the 
primary clients for DIS will, at least initially, c ome from the 
000, and the classified nature of information exchanged on 
distributed simulation nets makes the 000 approach appropriate . 
An interesting method for specifying security criteria can 
be found in the TNI Red Book (Part II), which defines Function to 
be the security problem being addressed, Mechanism as the means 






















effectiveness of the security mechanism. A method s u c h as this 
can be useful (irrespective of DoD, TCSEC, et. al ) i n resolvi ng 
the frequently ambiguous concepts of computer and ne t worki ng 
security. For example, a password mechanism mi ght be used to 
implement the function of user identification and authentication; 
the assurance provided by the mechanism would result from 
specifics of the implementation. 
30. DIS Security Reguirements. A comprehensive list of DIS 
security requirements is not available, nor is there one i n 
preparation. Yet certain specific security needs are already 
discernible. 
30.1. Encryption 
30.1.1. Confidentiality Reguirement. It is known that 
messages exchanged during a military simulation wi l l contai n 
sensitive data regarding weapons systems characterist ics a nd 
warfare tactics. A DIS exercise may also be the rehearsal of a n 
operational mission, and as such the data exchanged will be 
extremely sensitive. Clearly such information must be protected 
from eavesdropping by simulation non-participants, much in th e 
same manner as telemetry data is protected. Eavesdropping can 
occur via wiretapping, which is monitoring by entities not 
legitimately connected to the net, or by users who are 
legitimately connected but are accessing message data not 
intended or them. 
The primary mechanism for thwarting eavesdroppers is 
encryption of messages on the network. The architectural level 
at which encryption/decryption occurs is significant: encryption 
at the link level (L2) is more efficient, while encryption at the 
session layer or higher (L5+) allows users to be differentiated 
by different encryption keys, and protects messages for a greater 
part of their passage through the operating system of the host. 
Encryption is used for other tasks as well, in particular th e 
authentication of user identities (see below). 
Strength and throughput are two main parameters for 
evaluating an encryption algorithm. Very secure algorithms 
exist, but generally compromise the transmission rate on a 
network, i.e., there is a trade-off between assurance a nd 
performance. DIS requirements in this area appear to be of the 
high-assurance/ high-performance variety. 
30.1.2 . Evaluating Encryption Mechanisms. Assigning a nd 
distributing keys on a dynamic or per-session basis can b e a 
major difficulty. Fortunately, the area of Key Manageme nt 
Systems (KMS) is one in which many standards and c ommercial 
products exist. There are a l so a number of very strong 
encryption algorithms for wh i ch key distribution is not requi red . 
These are called public key ( PK) encryption algorithms; each user 






















PK algorithms are amongst the slowest in terms of throughput. 
For this reason, they are used to distribute smal l but cri t ical 
amounts of data, for example, the encryption keys to a fas t er 
algorithm, or authentication data known as digital signatures. 
One of the strongest h i gh-throughput algorithms is k nown as 
DES, for Data Encryption Standard. It was developed at IBM, a nd 
has been widely implemented in commercially available security 
products, including the Verdix secure Ethernet interface card. 
It is usually implemented as an LSI chip, with throughput rates 
approaching 10Mb. In spite of its strength, the NSA has not 
approved it. Nonetheless, a number of products util izing DES 
have been certified by the NCSC. 
A public-key algorithm, known as "EI Gamal", has been 
approved by the NSA, and shows strong promise of be i ng 
incorporated into emerging OSI security standards. It is a close 
cousin of the earlier Rivas-Shamir-Edelman (RSA) algorithm whi c h 
has been commercially integrated into various produc ts for some 
time. Both algorithms rely on the difficulty of factoring large 
primes, and are of approximately equal strength. 
30.1.3. DIS Encryption. Nodes on a DIS network wil l not 
transmit a great deal of data, but will receive data from all t he 
other nodes in the simulation. Thus a fast algorithm is 
required, if only on the decoding end. Algorithms s u c h as DES 
are suitable for Ethernet-range speeds; a notable example of this 
being the Verdix VSLAN-I00, which provides MLS-type security 
features (see below). For FOOl, encryption could nulli fy the 
speed advantages of the 100Mbs technology. 
FOOl fiber optics are relatively safe from wiretapping, so 
conceivably the need for encryption on a FOOl ring is r educed. 
It is clear, however, that the encryption problem for FOOl 
networks will eventually have to be solved. For one thing, 
eavesdropping by legitimately connected FOOl hosts must be 
prevented; likewise there is an eventual need for session level 
isolation and access control in multi-user applicat ion ga t eways . 
In the short term, only single simulations will run on the DIS 
net, and nonparticipants can be physically excluded; thus l i nk 
level encryption for FOOl can await the emergence o f a s uitably 
fast technology. 
30.2. Multilevel Security 
30.2.1. Access Control Requirement. We know that DIS will 
eventually allow multiple simulations to run simultaneously o n a 
single network. Enforcing the separation of simulations becomes 
a security issue when differing classification levels coexist , 
as, for example, when a highly classified weapons developme nt 
simulation is run together with a simulated battle scenario, 
presumably at a lower classi f ication level. Participants in one 






















exchanged in the other. It is also conceivable, that multiple 
levels of data classification could be required within a single 
scenario, as when, for example, a highly classified test weapon 
is introduced into a "normal" battle scene. 
Moreover, DIS security issues go far beyond the protection 
of run-time simulation messages. Computers that participate in 
more than one level of exercise will be required to store and to 
internally manipulate data of varying classifications, and to 
insure that only users with proper clearance can access 
classified data. This raises issues of Multilevel Security at 
both the Operating System and Database levels. The following 
sections discuss these issues in more detail. 
30.2.2. MLS Mechanisms. Multilevel (or label-based) 
security is the primary requirement of the "B" security levels 
defined in the 000 TCSEC. These levels are Bl, B2, B3, in 
ascending order of strength, based upon the degree of assurance 
provided by th~ enforcement mechanism. The mechanisms are called 
Mandatory Access Controls (MAC) because data transfer is based 
solely upon the classification and clearance labels involved, and 
not upon identity-based privileges. 
In the first example above, where two simulations coexisted 
with different levels of classification, access control could be 
enforced using an encryption mechanism, provided it 
differentiated individual simulation users. In general, though, 
the problems discussed above require maintenance and isolation of 
security levels within the individual systems, and a compatible 
network transport service to ensure consistency of classification 
between communicating nodes. 
Multilevel Security is implemented by defining a class of 
protected data objects, and attaching security labels or 
"classifications" to them. Autonomous entities (users and 
processes) are known as sUbjects; these also receive labels, or 
"clearances", by which their access to the protected objects lS 
regulated The set of subjects and objects, together with the 
rules for access, is formally known as the Security Policy . The 
enforcement mechanism for the policy is frequently referred to as 
the Reference Monitor. 
The Bell-Lapadula Model is a security Policy associated with 
the B2 security level. It contains the familiar "read down, 
write up" provisions which guarantee that classified information 
cannot flow to a lower-classified entity within a system. The 
Bell-LaPadula model is the most widely accepted and implemented 
access control model currently in existence. 
The Red Book interprets these concepts in the context of 
interconnected systems, or networks. Especially important are 
the issues of compatibility between security labels when 






















identities and privileges across the network. For thes e a nd 
other reasons, network security products are considered much mor e 
difficult to evaluate and certify than stand-alone sys t ems , a nd 
there are significantly fewer certified security products in this 
area. 
30.2.3. DIS Multilevel Requirements. As we h a v e seen, the 
need for Multilevel security in DIS is closely tied to exis t e nce 
of multiple concurrent simulations, or multiple levels of 
simulation hosted on single machine. If each simul ation nod e is 
assigned a single security level, and is only allowed to 
participate in exercises at that level, a network level MLS 
system, such as that provided by the Verdix VSLAN Ethernet 
interface, should suffice (or encryption can be used to separa te 
security levels). If a system must handle multip le l eve ls of 
classified data concurrently, an MLS Operating System will be 
required. Storage of multiple levels of classified DIS 
information within the system will require an MLS database 
facility. Product availability in these and other areas is 
discussed in the next section. 
Prototype DIS implementations will most likely not support 
multiple simulations, pending widespread availability of a 
standardized multicast mechanism. Hence the need for MLS 
operating systems and databases for the simulation hosts is not 
immediate (which is fortunate, as these products are current ly 
slow and difficult to integrate). 
30.3. Identity and Authentication. In a distributed 
interactive simulation, it is important to guarantee that 
participants are, in fact, who they say they are; this is known 
as the Authentication problem. Identification of entities can 
occur at varying levels of granularity: the level of host on a 
network, the level of human users on the network, or the 
identifications of individual processes. In the initial DIS 
environment, simulation hosts will participate in only one 
simulation at a time; it seems reasonable, therefore, to 
initially propose a per-node granularity of authenti cation . 
We have observed that encryption is frequentl y u sed t o 
provide authentication. An example of this is the Digital 
signature mechanism mentioned above. Digital Signa ture is a 
mechanism that can be provided by a reversible Public Key 
encryption algorithm, that is, one for which each userl s public 
key and private key exactly reverse the operation of each other . 
In such a case, a user X can send a message encrypted with hi s 
private key; anyone can decrypt it with X iS public key to confirm 
that only X could have sent it. 
Authentication is used in secure networks as a basis for 
automatically assigning clear ances on each node o f the netwo rk , 
for example when a user executes a remote login. Frequently a 






















certificate, which in addition to authenticating identity, 
contains additional network-wide security information as well. 
Generally speaking, a network authentication mechanism of 
this type will interface with a Key Management unit that 
generates and maintains cryptographic keys at the necessary 
degree of granularity. The specification and distributed 
operation of such a mechanism is quite difficult, for example, 
the interaction for crypto-based authentication mechanisms of SP3 
(the OSI/SDNS Layer 3 security protocol) and the distributed Key 
Management Base have yet to be completely specified. 
30.4. Integrity. In DIS, as in most environments, there is 
the need to insure that data is not corrupted, either 
deliberately or by accident. This issue of Integrity is a n 
important security problem, and applies to message data, stored 
information, and dynamically manipulated information wi thin an 
operating system. Again, cryptography plays an important role in 
data integrity verification (for example by checksums), and many 
network authentication services also support point-to-point 
integrity policies. More involved approaches formulat e 
integrity policies for system data, with models and enforcement 
mechanisms similar to the Bell-LaPadula policy used for B2-level 
access control. In some respects an integrity policy is the 
reverse of Bell-Lapadula, as the "write-up" operation permitted 
by the latter actually allows one to corrupt protected data at a 
classification level higher than oneself. 
30.5. Audit. A critical facility for all secure systems, 
including networks, is the audit facility. The audit facility 
maintains logs of security-relevant events in tamperproof , 
restricted access locations; typical examples of logged events 
include attempted logins and access to critical data. A fair 
number of commercial audit products exist. 
Audit trails can be maintained on individual systems, but a 
network audit facility is also desirable in DIS. Coordinating a 
distributed audit facility can be a problem, and might require 
utilities like NFS and yellow pages (secure versions of which are 
currently under development). The main problem with audit is 
storing and analyzing the enormous amount of data that can be 
generated. The primary approach to this problem is to specify a 
limited set of audit events; this greatly reduces the data 
volume. Many audit systems will have built in "triggers", or 
thresholds, that expand the level of audit detail in areas where 
certain conditions have been exceeded. Likewise, there are 
processing tools to make the analysis of audit data easier, 
should that prove necessary. 
30.6. Physical Security. Physical security consists of 
functions that can be performed by "physical" mechanisms, i .e., 
those that are not part of the computer operating system. A list 






















1) Protected cables, locked rooms, security guards, removable 
media 
2) Computer locks, disk drive locks, hardening against 
radiation leakage & radiation damage 
Physical security can come from unexpected sources, for 
example fiber-optic networks, which almost as a bonus provide 
several measures of physical security. Fiber optic networks 1) 
are difficult or impossible to tap undetected, 2) immune to EMR 
damage, and 3) do not leak EMR that can be monitored. 
In general, however, the methods of physical security lie 
outside our scope of interest. 
40. security Products. A list of certified network 
products can be found in the Information Systems Security 
Products and Services Catalogue, published by the NSA. 
50. Conclusions. The security situation for DIS is 
complicated by the desire for standards and interoperability, as 
well as by a real dearth of available products. Implementors of 
critical features, such as networking, operating systems, and 
database security will have to confront major systems integration 
and standards-conformance problems. At the same time, the 
classified environments in which DIS must operate will make 
adherence to formal standards of evaluation and certification 
more critical than in commercial environments. 
DIS is not the only standards effort hampered by the 
complexities of computer and network security. A long term DIS 
strategy for implementing security features must be developed. 
An evolutionary approach which utilizes available technologies 
and anticipates emerging ones (just as in the case of network 
architecture) should serve this effort well. The situation is 
one in which standards are evolving from implementations, not 
vice-versa . 
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